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While mandatory auto insurance laws virtually guarantee the
availability of remedies for auto injuries, other types of physical
injuries, including those resulting from domestic violence, lack similar
protections. By providing a broad array of compensation mechanisms
to auto accident victims, the law encourages people to drive more. The
rationale underlying that public policy has, however, eroded.
Environmental degradation, public health problems, and other costs
require overhauling the system. This Article recommends two changes
to the auto insurance system aimed at encouraging people to drive less.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote, "The general
principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls.
[The] cumbrous and expensive machinery [of the state] ought not to
be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived from
disturbing the status quo."' Thus, while the common law promises
that there is no right without a remedy, Holmes believed there
needed to be a strong justification to allow remedies for accidents
and other harms.
There is rarely any tort remedy without insurance.2 For decades,
the major mechanism in the United States for funding tort remedies
has been liability insurance-which is, in theory, private-but
actually is so infused with public policy that many consider it a
governmental mechanism in some contexts. Over the last century,
the "cumbrous and expensive machinery of the state" has been
marshaled to ensure that victims of car accidents are compensated.
The negligence regime, the dominant regime applied to car accidents
in the United States, is designed to take activity levels as a given, and
not to reduce them. Part I explains that mandatory auto insurance
laws, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, laws requiring
insurance be offered to risky drivers, and judicial constructions of
"public policy" are among the mechanisms that enable compensation
for auto accident victims. As cars have a most-favored transportation
status, injuries to people caused by cars have a most-favored injury
status. This phenomenon matches what Lawrence Friedman has
called the "general expectation of compensation" in U.S. tort law and
legal culture.' At the same time, the extensive array of insurance for
auto injuries contrasts starkly with the lack of insurance for many
other types of physical injuries, including domestic violence injuries.
The norm of the "general expectation of compensation" in
application, as Part I briefly shows and many of the papers in this
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76-77 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963).
2. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 1 (2008); Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort
Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1
(2005); Kent Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629 (1994).
3. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 60 (1985).
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symposium emphasize, 4 turns out to be inconsistent, incomplete, and
limited.
Part II views automobile insurance through a new lens.
Automobile insurance has developed almost exclusively as a victim-
compensation mechanism. 6 Its encouragement of driving has largely
been ignored, until now. Because auto insurance provides a broad
array of compensation mechanisms, it makes driving financially
more secure and thus encourages driving.' Further, to use Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein's phrase, the "choice architecture" of
automobile insurance, typically selling policies in one-year
increments at practically the same price whether a buyer drives a
little or a lot, encourages driving.' This is because once one has
purchased a policy, one can drive all one wants with no increased
insurance price.' The sale of auto insurance has been aptly likened to
an all-you-can-eat buffet, where consumers overfill their plates
because of the way the meal is priced. o Driving has many negative
externalities, including greenhouse gas emissions, risks of causing or
suffering physical injury, highway costs, and negative public health
consequences that were not considered when the current tort-and-
4. See, e.g., David Engel, Lumping as Default in Tort Cases: The Cultural Interpretation of
Injury and Causation, 44 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 33 (2010); Marc Galanter, The Dialectics of Injury
and Remedy, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2010); S. Lochlann Jain, Fear of Cancer, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 233 (2010); Douglas L. Johnson & Neville L. Johnson, What Happened to Unjust
Enrichment in Calfornia? The Deterioration of Equity in the Calfornia Courts, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 277 (2010); George Lovell, Imagined Rights Without Remedy: The Politics of Novel Legal
Claims, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 91 (2010); Gowri Ramachandran, Assault and Battery on Property,
44 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 253 (2010); Dayna Nadine Scott, Body Polluted: Questions of Scale,
Gender, and Remedy, 44 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 121 (2010).
5. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) for a discussion of this point in several contexts. See Jennifer
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 129 (2001), for a discussion of this
point specifically as it relates to domestic violence.
6. Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and the
Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 521, 524
(1998).
7. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 1-14 (2008) (explaining the impact of
design choices and how the arrangement of options can influence the choices people make).
8. Id. at 11.
9. See generally id. (describing how conscious arrangements of choices can influence
humans' decisions, using the example of how food placement in a cafeteria can influence the type
and amount of food that is chosen and consumed).
10. JASON E. BORDOFF & PASCAL J. NOEL, THE BROOKINGS INST., PAY-AS-YOU-DRIVE
AUTO INSURANCE: A SIMPLE WAY TO REDUCE DRIVING-RELATED HARMS AND INCREASE
EQUITY 5 (2008).
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insurance framework was built. " I propose generally that legislatures
and judges apply a broader concept of public policy-that includes
public health and environmental issues-when regulating auto
insurance. More concretely, I recommend two changes to the auto
insurance system aimed at encouraging people to drive less. 12 The
first is making the actual ongoing cost of insurance visible to people
as they drive. The second is encouraging pay-as-you-drive, or usage-
based, insurance, which uses data about mileage driven as a
significant component of the price of insurance. These two reforms
would reduce the amount of driving and the many costs associated
with driving.
I. How COMPENSATION OF AUTOMOBILE INJURIES Is FAVORED BY
INSURANCE AND TORT LAW (THUS ENCOURAGING DRIVING)
A. The Tort Regime ofNegligence Takes Activity Levels as a Given
The negligence liability regime that is applied to car accidents,
holding a driver liable only if her carelessness caused injury to
another, is not designed to affect (and particularly not designed to
reduce) activity levels. " The negligence theory takes the activity as a
given and requires only that participants in that activity take cost-
justified precautions. 1 This is not the only legal regime that could be
applied to car accidents. In theory, strict liability could be applied. In
fact, as autos and the injuries they caused became more widespread,
scholars and commentators began to float the idea of strict liability
11. See, e.g., James Woodcock et al., Public Health Benefits of Strategies to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Urban Land Transport, 374 LANCET 1930 (2009).
12. With Robert Jerry and others, I regard judicial decisions about auto insurance as a form
of regulation. See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 141-58 (4th ed. 2007).
13. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1980). As
William Vickrey noted in 1968, "systems which require payments by the actors only in case of
fault and only to the extent of the compensation received by others (even with expenses of
adjudication and administration added) fail to give an adequate incentive for seeking out
alternatives not involving the increased risk of vehicular accident." William Vickrey, Automobile
Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities and Insurance: An Economist's Critique, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS 464, 467 (1968); see also Aaron S. Edlin, Per-Mile Premiums for Auto
Insurance, 3 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6934, 1999) ("Every time a
driver takes to the road, and with each mile she drives, she exposes herself and others to the risk
of accident. Insurance premiums are only weakly linked to mileage, however, and have largely
lump-sum characteristics. The result is too much driving and too many accidents.").
14. See Shavell, supra note 13, at 2; Vickrey, supra note 13, at 467; see also Edlin, supra
note 13, at 3.
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on the basis that cars are a dangerous instrumentality. " A strict
liability regime raises the cost of an activity, thus encouraging actors
to consider, and possibly lower, their activity levels in order to save
costs. 16 But the "dangerous instrumentality" theory did not go far. "7
Also, comprehensive strict liability schemes have been proposed.
Indeed, in the 1930s, the leading tort and insurance experts of the day
put forth a detailed plan known as the Columbia Plan, which
proposed a complete scheme of strict liability without fault for auto
accidents coupled with limits on damages modeled on workers'
compensation. 8 This failed for a variety of reasons in the United
States, but the idea has become a reality in several parts of the world,
including New Zealand and parts of Canada. " Despite these ideas
for alternative liability regimes, the negligence regime is well
entrenched in U.S. auto law and provides no traction for reducing
activity levels.
B. Automobile Liability Insurance Is Mandatory in Almost All States
Requiring drivers to purchase liability insurance, as almost all
states do, shows that legislatures believe that compensating injuries
caused by negligent drivers is a compelling public policy. 20 Indeed,
the spread of auto use in the 1920s and 1930s in the United States
was accompanied by huge numbers of accidents, leading to calls for
regulation.2 1 Mandatory auto liability insurance began in 1927, with
Massachusetts passing the first such law 22 and the vast majority of
states currently requiring it. 23 In those few states where insurance is
not mandatory, financial responsibility laws reflect the same goal,
namely that there be a pool of money from which injured people can
draw for compensation. The public policy of victim compensation,
15. Simon, supra note 6, at 562; S. Lochlann Jain, "Dangerous Instrumentality ": The
Bystander as Subject in Automobility, 19 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 61, 61-94 (2004).
16. Shavell, supra note 13, at 2-3.
17. Jain, supra note 15, at 61-94.
18. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 74-76; Simon, supra note 6, at 567-85.
19. VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAw 39-40 (4th ed.
2009).
20. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 12, at 960.
21. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 70-74; ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE
LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES 385-86 (1988); Simon, supra note 6, at 530-67.
22. Simon, supra note 6, at 527.
23. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 73.
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particularly for negligently caused injuries, has been a driving force
for legislation and judicial decision since the first standard auto
policies were developed in the 1920s and 1930s. 24 Auto policies also
now contain first-party elements from which injured people may
collect medical expenses on an initially no-fault basis and may enjoy
other types of coverage like towing and collision. 25 Kenneth
Abraham, in his classic book Distributing Risk, gives the example of
a straightforward car accident in which the "simple problem of tort
liability is likely to be overwhelmed by the array of insurance
available to the parties."26
It is worthwhile reflecting for a moment on what that means and
contrasting it with other types of insurance and other types of losses.
Everyone who drives is required by law to have liability insurance so
that if the driver negligently injures someone, the injured person can
sue the driver for damages and there will be a pool of money
available to that injured person. Compensation for victims is an
important part of this framework. There are other implications too.
For instance, people can drive with minimal fear of personal liability
should they be careless and cause harm.2 7 Because drivers have
minimal fear of personal liability, their attention to safety is reduced,
according to classic moral hazard theory. 28 Their insurance rates may
go up in the future, but this is far removed from day-to-day driving
decisions that are closely tied to safety.
Decades ago, the decision was made that in this context, while
mandatory liability insurance would create moral hazard that would
increase risky behavior and injuries, this increase was "worth it"
because driving and compensation were so important.29 It is hard to
24. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, at 385-86.
25. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 133 (1986).
26. Id.
27. This is assuming that they have adequate insurance. However, even if a person does not
have adequate liability insurance, plaintiffs' lawyers much prefer to seek money from insurance
companies rather than from individuals. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money and the Moral
Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 275, 276 (2001). In the above situation, it
is more likely that an injured person will be undercompensated than that a wealthy person will
lose assets.
28. See Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 381-90 (1994).
29. See generally Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIs. L.
REV. 101, 108 (1998) (for compensatory purposes "insurance-deterrence tradeoff is widely
tolerated"); Simon, supra note 6, at 566, 576-77 (explaining how proponents of loss-spreading
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estimate the amount of increased risky driving caused by mandatory
auto insurance, but economists Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia
conclude that mandatory auto insurance actually has resulted in a
moral hazard cost in the form of increases in traffic fatalities." This
in itself is of serious concern. In addition, the presence of universal
mandatory liability insurance surely encourages the activity of
driving, since drivers do not need to take into account possible
personal liability if they make a careless mistake and injure someone.
C. Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage Provides
Additional Financial Protection
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, which must
either be purchased or offered in most states, also makes driving
financially safer. 31 This allows (and in some states requires) a driver
to purchase coverage to protect her in the event she is injured by
another driver who is not insured or who is inadequately insured.32
The coverage includes the equivalent of liability coverage for the
other driver, so the injured insured can claim pain and suffering and
other damages when injured by an uninsured driver's negligence.33
Such coverage provides even more security for driving by providing
liability compensation to a driver if she is injured by another driver
who is uninsured or underinsured.3 4 This typically inexpensive
coverage provides a way for drivers to buy plenty of insurance to
cover for someone else's failure to do the same. Whatever else this
coverage does, it makes driving more attractive and costs more
predictable by guaranteeing that more of the risks of driving are
covered by insurance. 3
auto insurance saw a parallel with workers' compensation, where both automobile and workplace
injuries at the time "involved horrific and largely unavoidable damage to individuals and to the
network of dependents, creditors, and others that economically relied on the individual").
30. Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident
Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 357 (2004).
31. ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE §§ 2.5-2.6, at
29-34 (rev. 2d ed. 1999).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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D. Companies Are Required to Insure Risky Drivers That
They Would Rather Not Insure
The policy of cradling auto accident victims with liability
insurance pools is so strong that auto insurance companies are
required to insure drivers that they do not want to insure-drivers
that insurance companies think are too dangerous to insure.36 In
order to drive, drivers must have insurance, so a decision that
someone is too risky to insure is a decision that the person cannot
drive. There are several mechanisms for requiring this, such as
assigned-risk plans and joint underwriting plans." Regardless of the
specific mechanism, the point is the same: driving is too important
for the insurance market to decide who can drive or not. Driving is so
important that the government must, and does, find a way to get
really risky drivers insured and on the road." This has the effect of
making it less safe to drive because of the dangerous drivers on the
road who have insurance, and at the same time somewhat mitigates
that effect by requiring a pool of funds to be available for liability
claims. As making coastal insurance available to homeowners who
insurers do not want to insure leads to inopportune coastal
development,39 so mandating coverage of dangerous drivers likely
leads both to more driving and to more bad driving.
E. Auto Insurance Pricing Is Not Sensitive to the
Amount a Person Drives
Auto insurance is sold by the year, and the cost is roughly the
same for drivers, regardless of their annual mileage.4 0 The way
36. Id § 2.8.
37. See Residual Markets, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/
media/hottopics/insurance/residual (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
38. Another context of mandating insurance when the market fails is urban Fair Access to
Insurance Requirement plans, which about half the states have. These were instituted after the
urban riots of the 1960s to ensure that property insurance was available in inner cities. The public
policy reasons for this market intervention are quite different from the requirements to insure
risky drivers. Id.; see Joshua A. Randlett, Fair Access to Insurance Requirements: Do "FAIR"
Property Insurance Premiums for Individual Coastal Property Owners in Massachusetts Equate
with Fairness to the Greater Market?, 15 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 127, 134-35 (2010).
39. Residual Markets, supra note 37 ("One disadvantage of Beach and Windstorm Plans,
and the National Flood Insurance Program, is that the availability of insurance encourages
development of coastal areas where construction otherwise would not be feasible . . . ."). See
generally Randlett, supra note 38, at 134-36 (citing growth in "coastal areas at risk of hurricane
damage attributed to 'the rapid rise in coastal development and property values"').
40. BORDOFF & NOEL, supra note 10, at 5.
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policies are sold, typically in one-year or six-month increments,
makes day-to-day decisions whether to drive far removed from the
cost of insurance. 4' The insurance cost is significant. "Americans pay
an average of 6.6 cents in collision and liability insurance premiums
for every mile they drive."42 Because most cars get approximately
twenty miles per gallon, this means that drivers pay approximately
$1.32 per gallon in insurance costs.43 Yet, drivers' mental
calculations generally do not work that way. Drivers tend to forget
the up-front insurance cost when deciding whether and how much to
drive. 4
Second, insurance policy pricing is not sensitive to the amount
one drives. A driver who is the same age and gender as her neighbor,
who has the same driving record as her neighbor, and who drives
5,000 miles per year, pays roughly the same for auto insurance as her
neighbor who drives 50,000 miles per year.45 Thus, once a driver
purchases a policy, insurance does not provide an incentive to drive
less. Economists have been making this point about auto insurance
pricing for over forty years. 46 Technology now exists, as it did not
41. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 75-76, 97-100 (using situations
where people get pleasure now and pay consequences later as examples of situations where
choice architecture should be analyzed); id at 98-99 (claiming that car buyers underweight the
opportunity costs of buying a car as compared with the costs of taking cabs because the costs
associated with cab use are more salient than those of car ownership); id at 185-96 (discussing
improving incentives for environmental protection, such as providing information to consumers
on how much energy they use).
42. BORDOFF & NOEL, supra note 10, at 45.
43. See id; Aaron S. Edlin, Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance, in ECONOMICS FOR AN
IMPERFECT WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 53, 53-54 (Richard Arnott et al.,
eds.).
44. Edlin, supra note 43, at 53. The related issue of driving behavior sensitivity to gas prices,
known as price elasticity of demand for gasoline, is complex and thorny. See, e.g., Jonathan E.
Hughes et al., Evidence of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand, 29
ENERGY J. 113 (2008); Clifford Krauss, As Gas Prices Go Down, Driving Goes Up, N.Y. TIMES,
(Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/business/worldbusiness/30iht-
30gasoline.17363533.html?pagewanted=1. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at
98-99 (claiming car buyers underweight the opportunity costs of buying a car as compared with
the costs of taking cabs because the costs associated with cab use are more salient than those of
car ownership); id. at 134-36 (discussing the importance of clear disclosure of cost to consumers
when making financial decisions).
45. BORDOFF & NOEL, supra note 10, at 5. Although some companies ask for mileage
driven, this generally has little effect on premium amounts. In one recent instance, USAA's
receipt of information that a car was driven only one-third of what the company had thought, and
less than 5,000 miles per year, resulted in a decreased premium of only thirteen dollars. Interview
with USAA Employee (Mar. 1, 2010) (on file with author).
46. See Vickrey, supra note 13, at 464 (noting in a 1968 article the lack of incentive to drive
less).
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when the issue was first raised in 1968, to accurately and
inexpensively determine how many miles have been driven on an
ongoing basis, and to price insurance accordingly.47
F. Courts Construe "Public Policy" in the Context of
Auto Insurance as Narrowly Aimed at Victim Compensation
When judges construe exclusions in auto policies, they do so
against a backdrop of state legislation that makes certain coverage
mandatory.48 Many courts have struck down certain exclusions such
as family-member exclusions (which are contractual provisions
precluding coverage for claims by one family member against
another), because they violate "public policy."4 9 The public policy, in
the words of the Supreme Court of Texas, is simply that of "ensuring
that every motor vehicle is covered by an automobile liability policy
that will protect all claimants against losses which arise out of the
operation of the vehicle."" This public policy is rooted in the
legislature's decision to make auto liability coverage mandatory. By
providing even broader coverage than arguably is contracted for,
these decisions reduce driving-related financial risks to drivers, thus
making driving yet more attractive.
G. People Injured by Autos More Frequently Claim and
Receive Compensation Than People Injured in Other Ways
Given the prevalence of auto liability coverage, it is not
surprising that automobile injuries are the type of injury for which
people most frequently claim compensation (leaving aside workplace
47. See infra Part II.B.2.
48. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 933 F.2d 848, 852 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991).
49. See, e.g., id at 848-49 (holding that auto policy provision excluding coverage for bodily
injury to any insured or member of the insured's family residing in the household contradicts
Oklahoma public policy); Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865, 865 (Ky. 1981); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 516 A.2d 586, 591-92 (Md. 1986); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ballard, 54 P.3d 537, 541 (N.M. 2002); Estep v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 703 P.2d 882, 884-88 (N.M. 1985); Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 879
S.W.2d 1, n.6 (Tex. 1993); see 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 250 (2010); GEORGE J.
COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 19:4 (2d ed. 2009); Martin J. McMahan,
Annotation, Validity, Under Insurance Statutes, of Coverage Exclusion for Injury to or Death of
Insured's Family or Household Members, 52 A.L.R. 4TH 18 (1987); Jennifer Wriggins,
Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance "Family Member Exclusions ": Shared Assumptions,
Relational andLiberal Feminist Challenges, 17 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 252-53 (2002).
50. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 879 S.W.2d at 2.
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injuries) by a wide margin." In an authoritative 1991 study, the
claim rate for auto injuries in the United States was 44 percent,
contrasted with 3 percent for non-workplace, non-motor vehicle
injuries.5 2
A more recent study of paid auto claims using data through 1997
found that the claim rate for auto injuries rose somewhat between
1991 and 1997." Regardless of the relatively small changes in
claiming rates for auto injuries, it is undisputed that auto claims are
by far the largest single category of tort cases. 4 There is a societal
expectation that losses from car accidents should not lie where they
fall but instead should be shifted and spread through liability and
insurance."
H. Other Types of Tortiously Caused Injury Are Likely to Be
Uninsured and Uncompensated
Injuries from sources other than cars are not necessarily covered
by liability insurance of any sort. 56 No governmental mandate
requires a homeowner or landlord to purchase liability insurance.
Banks require liability insurance as a condition for a mortgage, but if
a person has paid off her mortgage, it is up to her whether to buy
liability insurance." Stated otherwise, there is no governmental
public policy specifying that it is essential that victims of either
51. See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 110-11 (1991) (noting exclusion of workplace injuries in analysis because
workers compensation generally covers such injuries).
52. Id. at 121.
53. Mark J. Browne & Joan T. Schmit, Litigation Patterns in Automobile Bodily Injury
Claims 1977-1997: Effects of Time and Tort Reforms, 75 J. RISK & INS. 1, 83-100 (2008)
(finding attorney hiring and claim filing have risen over time but have been somewhat dampened
by tort reform).
54. Id.
55. This neither asserts that the losses from car accidents are always clear, nor that they are
adequately compensated. Discussion and debate about the adequacy of damages is perennial and
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 91-92, 100-03
(2008); Symposium, Who Feels Their Pain? The Challenge of Non-Economic Damages in Civil
Litigation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2006) (providing information and analysis regarding the topic
of awarding damages for noneconomic injury, particularly pain-and-suffering damages in tort
cases).
56. This discussion focuses on injuries generally recognized as tortious and does not explore
issues surrounding the recognition of injuries as discussed by many other participants in the
Injuries Without Remedies Symposium. See supra note 4.
57. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 176-78 (describing the history of marketing
homeowners liability insurance policies).
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homeowner or landlord negligence must be compensated for their
injuries." Rather, such negligence victims are subject to the luck of
the draw, when it comes to insurance and compensation. To take a
concrete example, tenants injured by a landlord's negligence leading
to injuries from a fire or from lead paint may well find that their
landlord lacks insurance for their injuries."
Even more starkly, victims of injuries from domestic violence
are excluded from liability insurance compensation. Despite the
serious and widespread problem of domestic violence, which almost
by definition is tortious (as well as criminal), the number of tort
cases filed for domestic violence injuries is miniscule. " Domestic
violence injuries are injuries without remedies. Liability insurance
exclusions, together with short statutes of limitations for intentional
torts and other factors, almost guarantee that tort law will not provide
a useful remedy to injured people in this context. "
The remedial arrangements that privilege auto injuries and
disadvantage other injuries are both understandable and problematic.
These remedial arrangements-the panoply of tort and insurance
mechanisms surrounding auto insurance and driving-developed
during periods when the public health and environmental
58. On a related note, no statute exists that requires the purchase of life insurance, should
one decide against it. The taxation system includes incentives for people and employers to
purchase life insurance, but does not require purchase. See generally Kyle Logue, The Current
Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond, 32 CuMB. L. REv. 1 (2001) (exploring
issues raised by recent evidence of underinsurance). This implies that a person's decision to
underinsure oneself and leave one's dependents with virtually nothing is his to make.
59. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 605, 612
(2006).
60. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence in First Year Torts, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511,
512-13 (2006).
61. The two most significant liability exclusions are the intentional acts exclusion and the
family-member exclusion. Homeowner and car insurance policies have exclusions that deny
coverage for intentional acts of the insured. Since injuries from domestic violence are almost
always intentional acts (battery, assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, for example), it is inevitable that there is generally no liability coverage for
domestic violence torts. See Wriggins, supra note 5, at 135-37. In addition, liability insurance
companies have inserted family-member exclusions into their policies as standard features. These
provide that the insurance policy will not cover the claim if a family member files suit against
another family member for injury, applying to both negligence and intentional tort claims. Id.
With no applicable liability insurance for the reasons stated above, potential plaintiffs are forced
to seek recovery against assets of the defendant (if any). This is never a lawyer's preference since
few people have unprotected assets for recovery. Id. at 137-39. In some states, any tort claims
must be brought in the same lawsuit as the divorce claims. This presents a huge disincentive for
domestic violence survivors who might only be able to consider a tort claim after they have
obtained a divorce and found a safe setting in which to contemplate such a lawsuit. Id. at 140-41.
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externalities of automobiles were not understood or considered.
Instead, they reflected widespread love for automobiles and the
freedom they provide, concern for the physical injuries they cause,
and appreciation of their economic importance." Auto injuries also
fit within the tort paradigm of accidental harm caused by strangers.'
The panoply of tort and insurance mechanisms that disadvantage
domestic violence injuries mostly arose when interspousal tort
immunity was in force and when the legal system excluded women
from decision-making roles. Domestic violence injuries, which are
likely to be intentionally caused by a person whom the victim knows,
fall outside the traditional tort paradigm of accidental harm caused
by one stranger to another. ' Advantaging auto injuries while
disadvantaging domestic violence injuries is unjustifiable from
deterrence, compensation, corrective justice, and gender equality
perspectives. Neither set of remedial arrangements is inevitable. In
other work, I have suggested an approach for making domestic
violence torts into injuries with remedies and promoting deterrence,
compensation, justice, and gender equality; 61 I will not repeat that
here. Instead, I will approach auto insurance as a public health and
environmental issue, taking auto injuries as paradigmatic injuries
with remedies and moving toward broader consideration of the
activity of driving itself.
II. AUTO INSURANCE AS A PUBLIC HEALTH, COST, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE:
TOWARD A BROADER CONCEPT OF PUBLIC POLICY
A. The Many Reasons to Discourage Driving
Given the huge public health problems, environmental
degradation, and other costs caused by cars, there is an urgent need
for a shift in public policy regarding cars' use. Emissions from cars
62. See Jain, supra note 15; Simon, supra note 6. For instance, Catherine Barnes writes that
autos were warmly welcomed by African-Americans who, if they could afford a car, rushed to
enjoy the freedom it gave them from Jim Crow restrictions in public transportation. CATHERINE
A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT 17-18
(1983).
63. See Wriggins, supra note 5, at 178-83.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 129.
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are a huge element of greenhouse gas emissions. 6 Greenhouse gas
emissions are the primary cause of global warming, which has had
and will have massive consequences and costs. 67 Cars have negative
public health consequences in terms of reducing humans' physical
activity and increasing heart disease, in addition to affecting human
health through air pollution. " Sprawl, which both necessitates and is
a product of car dependence, entails huge financial and non-financial
costs. 69 While many factors determine how much people drive,
including economic and family necessity, it is still clear that
Americans drive more than they need to, and that the amount of
driving is unsustainable. Auto liability insurance is a staggering cost
to consumers, and road maintenance and construction are immense
costs to society. 70 Assumptions and priorities that held sway during
the last ninety years about expanding insurance and victim
compensation in the auto field, which were aimed at making driving
economically safer and more widespread as an activity, must be
revised.
Federal incentives and regulations focused on externalities from
driving have targeted emissions and fuel efficiency, while state rules
on driving have been directed at driver safety. " Insurance regulation,
in the purview of the states-while purportedly based on public
policy-has been implicitly opposed to the goal of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and driving. 72 Rather, insurance regulation
66. Woodcock et al., Energy and Transport, 370 LANCET 1078, 1078-88 (2007).
67. Key Findings, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
http://www.globalchange.gov/publications/reports/scientific-assessments/us-impacts/key-findings
(last visited Sept. 2, 2010).
68. Woodcock et al., supra note 11, at 1930.
69. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Walmart's Other Woman Problem: Sprawl and Work-Family
Balance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1713, 1713-14 (2007).
70. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 69 (stating that the cost of liability insurance for auto
accidents is $110 billion per year; cost of first party insurance and other forms of physical
damage to the policyholder's own car is an additional $70 billion); DAVID BURWELL & ROBERT
PUENTES, NAT'L GOVERNORS AsS'N, INNOVATIVE STATE TRANSPORTATION FUNDING AND
FINANCING 1 (Darren Springer ed., 2008) (noting that the National Surface Transportation Policy
and Revenue Study Commission in 2008 recommended spending at least $225 billion annually
for the next 50 years to maintain and enhance the U.S. surface transportation system).
71. ALLEN GREENBERG, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., DESIGNING PAY-PER-MILE AUTO
INSURANCE REGULATORY INCENTIVES USING THE NHTSA LIGHT TRUCK CAFE RULE AS A
MODEL 13 (2006).
72. Id. at 5-6.
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has treated driving almost as a right of Americans; the privileging of
auto injuries over other injuries reflects this assessment."
Little attention has been given to discouraging driving, although
reducing miles traveled would be as effective a strategic response to
many of the public concerns linked with driving as the focus on fuel
efficiency, emissions, and safety.7 Simply put, if people drive less,
they will use less gasoline, cause fewer emissions, and be less at risk
of suffering injury in a car accident. A reduction in driving would
also have substantial health benefits, particularly by lowering heart
disease. " Public policy connected to automobiles now cuts strongly
in favor of finding ways to discourage driving. 7
Driving is inextricably tied to insurance. Therefore, automobile
insurance reform should be tailored to discourage driving. All
alternatives that discourage driving should be evaluated, including
analyzing and questioning the insurance mechanisms that encourage
driving. 7 Even the use of the negligence regime for auto accidents,
because it does not affect activity levels, should be discussed."
Relatively uncontroversial mechanisms, such as assigned-risk pools
that force companies to insure people they do not want to insure and
that give risky people the right to drive, should be analyzed and
questioned." Legislatures' and courts' narrow view of "public
policy" in the context of insurance policies should be reconsidered. 8
Two of the most promising ideas for discouraging driving are first,
making people more aware of day-to-day insurance costs, and
second, making auto insurance pricing more sensitive to the amount
people drive through pay-as-you-drive, or usage-based, rate policies.
73. Since states require that insurance be offered even to potentially risky drivers and have
detailed statutory limitations on policy cancellations, state laws treat driving almost as a right.
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2911 (1977). The fact that one has to pay to exercise
this "right" does not undermine the point, because there are many rights in our system of negative
rights that a person has to pay to exercise. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
74. GREENBERG, supra note 71, at 13.
75. Woodcock et al., supra note 11, at 1930, 1935-36.
76. See, e.g., id. at 1930 (discouraging travel in private motor vehicles to provide larger
health benefits).
77. Given the use of the negligence regime in the context of auto injuries, it is hard to
imagine repealing mandatory auto insurance laws or changing uninsured/underinsured options,
but more thought should be given to aspects of our system that we take for granted. See supra
Parts I.A. and I.B.
78. See supra Part IA.
79. See supra Part I.D.
80. See supra Part I.F.
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B. Two Insurance-Related Ways to Discourage Driving
1. Make Insurance (and Gas) Costs More Visible
Many insureds are not conscious of the ongoing cost of
insurance as they use it because the insurance costs, after the initial
purchase, are not visible to consumers. The current choice
architecture of auto insurance pricing encourages driving for two
main reasons. First, people may feel the sting of making monthly
payments to their insurance companies, but people do not see or
think about the costs as they drive." Second, the insurance costs of
the activity do not correlate to the amount people use it.82 While it is
in both society's interest-and in many cases an individual's
interest-to drive less, the incentive structure does not support
driving less. Restructuring the choice architecture of auto insurance
pricing to make costs more salient would incentivize driving less.
A person's energy use is generally invisible to that person.
According to studies by Clive Thompson, making the amount of
household energy that consumers use more apparent and visible to
them results in significantly less energy use. " It is likely that
installing some kind of meter (similar to a taxi meter) by the
dashboard of a car-so that drivers could see in dollars and cents as
they drive how much money they were spending per mile on
insurance-would help reduce driving. 84 Perhaps when a person gets
out of her car the device could print out a "receipt" or display the
cost of the trip on a screen. The meter could be standard equipment
and could be programmed to calculate the insurance cost to the
individual or the average cost of insurance in that area. With digital
technology, this sort of device would probably be very cheap indeed.
This device could reduce driving by foregrounding costs that are
practically invisible on a day-to-day basis, even without changing the
pricing structure.
81. See generally THALER & SUN STEIN, supra note 7, at 100-01 (stating that people discount
opportunity costs of car ownership and insurance as less salient than using taxis); id. at 187-97
(discussing ways to give consumers more feedback about their energy use so as to encourage
them to use less energy).
82. See infra Part II.B.2.
83. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 196.
84. The meter could add in gas usage and price to create an even more complete picture.
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2. Encourage Usage-Based, or Pay-As-You-Drive, Auto Insurance
In addition to making costs more visible, another idea for
decreasing car use through insurance changes is the usage-based
option, also known as pay-as-you-drive, which makes the amount
one drives a significant component of the price of insurance. In
October 2009, California, the largest private car insurance market in
the United States, adopted regulations allowing companies to adopt
pay-as-you-drive insurance. This type of mechanism deals with the
issue of the blunt pricing of auto policies discussed above to make
pricing more correlated to actual miles driven." The proposal is to
allow, encourage, or require a pay-per-usage option, so that in
addition to broad risk gauges currently used, insurance companies
would be allowed, encouraged, or required to offer a pay-per-usage
option. 8 The technology exists now to cheaply monitor miles driven,
location of those miles, time of day, and even aggressiveness or lack
thereof of driving. " A recent study on this issue estimates that if this
type of pricing were widely adopted, driving would decline by
8 percent nationwide, thereby reducing oil consumption by 4 percent
and carbon dioxide emissions by 2 percent. 90 Further, the study
estimates that it would reduce driving-related harms by
approximately $50 to 60 billion a year. 91 It also would reduce
insurance costs for about two-thirds of customers. 92
A recent Brookings Institution report details the following three-
part strategy: (1) states should pass laws allowing mileage-based
premiums; (2) the federal government should increase funding to
pilot programs by $15 million over five years (a pittance); and (3) the
federal government should adopt a $100 tax credit for each new
85. See DEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP, CALIFORNIA PAY-AS-You-DRIVE AUTO REGULATIONS:
AN OPPORTUNITY TO Go GREEN AND GARNER A GREATER SHARE OF THE COUNTRY'S LARGEST
PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO MARKET (2008), available at http://www.deweyleboeuf.com/-/
media/Files/clientalerts/CaliforniaPayAsYouDriveAutoRegulationsAnOpportunitytoGoGreenand
GameraGreaterShareoftheCountrysLargestPrivatePassengerAutoMarket.ashx.
86. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5 (2009); see DEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP, supra note 85.
87. See supra Part I.E.
88. See BORDOFF & NOEL, supra note 10, at 5; GREENBERG, supra note 71, at 3-4.
89. Progressive's insurance includes data on sudden acceleration and how often a driver
slams on the brakes. Snapshot Privacy Statement, PROGRESSIVE.COM
http://www.progressive.com/snapshot/privacy-statement.aspx (last visited May 13, 2010).
90. BORDOFF & NOEL, supra note 10, at 2.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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policy a company writes, as the costs of monitoring mileage may be
greater than the expected benefit to individual insurance firms, but
are much smaller than the social benefit." This tax credit should be
phased out once five million vehicles are covered. California's
recent step of allowing pay-as-you-drive by regulation is even more
straightforward than making changes by legislation, and indeed
under most state laws, pay-as-you-drive can be implemented without
legislative change."
To be sure, various issues remain to be resolved, including the
specificity of the data to be received by the insurance companies and
how the insurance companies will obtain that data. 96 Drivers could
provide to insurance companies very specific data on location, time
of day, and other factors, even including aggressiveness of driving;
such data could be provided on an ongoing basis using GPS, or other
technology, so that rates could be regularly adjusted. Progressive
Insurance has sold, for several years, a type of policy in some states
(called "MyRate") where customers install a sensor-chip device that
transmits data regarding time of day, location of miles, and some
specific driving information (like sudden stops) to Progressive. This
allows for continuous rate adjustments depending on these factors, in
exchange for a minimum fixed discount of 5 percent and the
possibility of larger discounts based on usage.98 General Motors
Acceptance Corporation offers insurance using the OnStar data
transmission system. 99 There is an online message board consisting
93. Id. at 21-23.
94. Id.
95. See RANDALL GUENSLER ET AL., CURRENT STATE REGULATORY SUPPORT FOR PAY-
AS-YOU-DRIVE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE OPTIONS (2010).
96. Usage-based insurance, for example, would not solve all the financial issues related to
funding the U.S. road system. See JAMES M. WHIrY & JOHN R. SVADLENAK, OR. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., DISCERNING THE PATHWAY TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL MILEAGE-BASED
CHARGING SYSTEM (2009), available at http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/
SR299Mileage.pdf. The question of whether usage-based auto insurance should be mandatory is
beyond the scope of this Article.
97. According to fueleconomy.gov, a United States Department of Energy website,
"aggressive driving. . . can lower your gas mileage by 33 percent at highway speeds and by 5
percent around town." Driving More Efficiently, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/driveHabits.shtmIl (last visited July 2, 2010).
98. Details vary by state. Aaron Landry, Progressive MyRate, S4XTON.COM,
http://s4xton.com1753/progressive-myrate/ (last visited May 13, 2010).
99. The GAMC Insurance Low-Mileage Discount, ONSTAR.GMAC.COM,
http://onstar.gmac.com (last visited May 13, 2010).
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of Progressive customers' observations about the program that
contains a range of praise, concern, and criticism. "o
The California Insurance Commissioner, in adopting
regulations, made the mileage determination hinge primarily on
odometer readings done by certain actors such as auto repair shops,
smog-check stations, insurers, or the insured. The new regulations
also allowed use of technological devices, but only for actual miles
driven, not for other characteristics of the insured's driving. ' Under
the new regulations, insurers can retroactively or prospectively adjust
premiums based on actual miles driven, as long as the consumer is
given notice. 102 Many specifics have yet to be worked out. As Aaron
Edlin, a long-time proponent of pay-as-you-drive insurance, stated in
some of his comments to the California commissioner:
[A]ll the benefits from pay-as-you-drive-less accidents,
less emissions, less congestion, less road expenditures-
depend upon people choosing to drive less. To this end, as
much of the fixed cost of insurance as possible must be
shifted to the marginal mile of driving, where the decision
is, and people must understand this. The system must be
simple and transparent. 103
Edlin includes several invoice forms so that the discount from
driving less will be as clear as possible to drivers. If the Progressive
Insurance message board about the MyRate program is an accurate
indicator, the frequent rate changes depending on driving details
make MyRate customers very aware of their day-to-day driving
decisions. Nuanced feedback such as that from the MyRate program
likely makes drivers more aware of their daily driving decisions than
100. Someone wrote "installing this chip would probably increase my insurance by 1,000%. 1
have a lead foot." Someone else wrote that if his speed was monitored it would help him slow
down. Several people objected to insurance companies having detailed data about their driving.
Several made comments such as
people complain that their rates aren't representative of their actual driving
behavio[]r. Now that there's an option to show the insurance company how
they actually drive, people are complaining that the IC [insurance company]
will have accurate data. Bottom line, only the people who have something to
hide won't wanna join the program .. .which is exactly the point.
Landry, supra note 98.
101. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(c)(2)(F)(i)(l)-(5) (2009).
102. Id. § 2632.5(c)(6)(ii).
103. AARON S. EDLIN, EXTERNALITIES AND PAY AS You DRIVE AUTO INSURANCE (2008),
available at http://works.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context-aaron-edlin.
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an annual discount or surcharge as contemplated by the California
regulations would do. Nonetheless, the California regulations and
other states' efforts offer exciting possibilities for making auto
insurance more price-sensitive and reducing auto use and its negative
consequences.
CONCLUSION
This Article looks at the privileged status of auto accident
injuries through a skeptical lens. Car accident injuries are injuries
with remedies compared to other types of injuries, and "the
cumbrous and expensive machinery of the state," in Justice Holmes's
words, " gives auto injuries a most-favored injury status. The
exceptional panoply of compensation mechanisms available to
people injured by cars arguably disadvantages victims of other sorts
of injuries, and promotes driving in a variety of ways. While this
hierarchy of injury and encouragement of car use were
understandable decades ago, they are unjustifiable today. Given the
negative consequences of driving, and the importance of insurance to
all aspects of driving, it is time to consider ways that auto insurance
may be structured so as to discourage driving. The choice
architecture of auto insurance pricing and payments encourages
driving, but several shifts could be made that would discourage
driving. The first is to make the ongoing costs of auto insurance
visible to people as they drive, instead of making those costs
practically invisible as the current payment structure does. A second
way is to not only allow, but actually encourage, usage-based, or
pay-as-you-drive, programs on a widespread basis. This would make
the insurance component of the price of driving more closely related
to the amount people drive and provide a financial incentive to drive
less.
104. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 76.
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